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Abstract 
Previous research documents a correlation between education and political ideology, usually indicating a 
positive relationship between education and left-wing political views. In this paper, I examine to what extent this 
association is causal. I merge political ideology data from 25 waves of Eurobarometer surveys with information 
on 18 educational reforms in 11 European countries. I then instrument for educational attainment with a 
regression discontinuity design that estimates the increase in education due to compulsory educational reforms. 
Notably, it appears that omitted variables bias is important here. I find a significant causal effect of education 
moving individuals to the right when properly addressing the endogeneity whereas there is a significant 
association between education and left-wing political ideology when treating education as exogenous. I find that 
on average, among the individuals compelled into additional education from these specific reforms, an 
additional year of education moves individuals to the right of the political continuum by about 5–6%. However, I 
also find no evidence of a causal effect on political ideology for a subgroup of countries. 
Keywords 
Education, Political ideology, Europe, Compulsory education reforms 
1. Introduction 
Researchers have long been interested in the effect of education on political ideology. Most previous 
evidence suggests that education is associated with a more liberal ideology (Dunn, 2011; Weakliem, 
2002). Moreover, it is often stated or implied that education causes individuals to move to the political 
left (for example, Dunn, 2011; Weakliem, 2002; Weil, 1985). However, to the author's knowledge, 
previous studies on political ideology have not dealt with the endogeneity of education. Specifically, 
previous cross-sectional research may suffer from omitted variables bias because there are likely 
unobserved factors that affect political ideology and lead individuals to attain higher levels of 
education. For example, innate personality characteristics or the political ideology of one's parents are 
unobserved and can affect both educational attainment and one's own political ideology. Perhaps 
more worrisome is that it is unclear what the direction of the bias in previous studies would be. There 
are plausible stories as to how these unobserved factors could push one either to the political right or 
to the left while simultaneously affecting educational attainment. Thus, previous studies are limited in 
their ability to inform us on what would happen to political ideology in an alternative world where 
individuals are compelled into more education. 
In contrast, this paper contributes to the literature by estimating the causal effect of education on 
political ideology as measured by self-identified left-right placement. The analysis overcomes the 
endogeneity of education through leveraging changes in compulsory education laws in 20th century 
Europe. The key feature of these law changes is that individuals were forced into additional education 
rather than self-selecting into more education. This exogenous shift in educational attainment can then 
be utilized to identify the effect of education on the outcome of interest. This instrumental variables 
(IV) approach has now been firmly established in the literature and has been utilized to explain the 
impact of education on a wide variety of outcomes. 
Recent research suggests that the left-right scale as a construct is problematic. Specifically, Bauer, 
Barbera, Ackermann, and Venetz (2015)argue that the left-right scale is a vague concept and empirical 
relationships will be biased as a result. In particular, the authors provide evidence that education is 
endogenous to self-placement on the left-right political scale in Germany. An omitted variable (the 
meaning that individuals attach to the concepts of political “left” and “right”) is correlated with 
education and self-placement on the left-right scale. In the typical analysis of the association between 
education and left-right identity, we would not know “whether education affects ideology directly or 
merely through the different associations it triggers within respondents” (Bauer et al., 2015). This is the 
benefit of the identification strategy regression employed in the present paper. Rather than simply 
using the reported level of education, I estimate educational attainment utilizing a regression 
discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits the timing of compulsory educational reforms. One group of 
individuals was born just prior to a reform and another group of individuals was born just after a 
reform. After controlling for cohort trends, unobserved characteristics such as conceptual associations 
should be on average the same across these two groups. Thus, I am plausibly able to overcome the 
omitted variables problem detailed in Bauer et al. (2015). 
 
Supporting the concerns of Bauer et al. (2015), I do find that the observed association between 
education and left-right political identity from a standard OLS regression is quite different from the 
causal relationship estimated utilizing the fuzzy RDD. There is a small but highly statistically significant 
association between education and left-wing identity in the observational regressions that treat 
education as exogenous. However, once leveraging the educational reforms as instruments for 
endogenous educational attainment, I find that education significantly moves individuals to the right in 
their political identities. Among individuals who were affected by the educational reforms (the 
compliers), an additional year of education moves an individual to the right by approximately 0.2–0.4 
points on a 10 point scale (4%–8% relative to sample mean) depending on the specification, with most 
estimates falling near 0.25 (5% relative to sample mean). I primarily utilize parametric specifications of 
a fuzzy RDD and find that the results are robust to linear and quadratic controls and to the sample 
bandwidth chosen. However, I also use nonparametric local linear regressions to confirm the results. 
 
There are several theses from the political science and sociology literatures regarding the effect of 
educational attainment on political identity. As explained by Dunn (2011), these theories include “the 
self-interest thesis, the developmental thesis and the socialization thesis.” The self-interest thesis 
reasons that those who attain higher levels of education are likely to earn higher incomes, which 
attracts them to a right-wing identity out of self-interest. As explained by Dunn (2011), this thesis can 
explain the traditional European association of higher education leading to a right-wing 
identification. Powdthavee and Oswald (2014) provide an analytical framework in which a rational 
voter trades off a desire for low taxes with a desire for a public good. They show that an increase in 
income can theoretically affect left-right political affiliation for such a utility maximizing 
agent. Powdthavee and Oswald (2014) then provide evidence that an exogenous shock to income 
through winning the lottery leads to significant movement to the right in political affiliation in the UK, 
supporting the idea that individuals act out of self-interest when voting. 
 
In contrast, the developmental thesis predicts that more education will lead to more of a left-wing 
political identity. In this thesis, education expands one's perspective and stimulates cognitive growth, 
leading to a more liberal ideology (Phelan, Link, Stueve, & Moore, 1995). Finally, the socialization thesis 
maintains that political attitudes are transmitted to students through social learning processes. 
Students learn about society's attitudes through the behaviors that are modeled and reinforced in the 
educational system. A leading specific example of the socialization thesis is Weakliem's (2002) core 
values thesis. In this theory, education serves to increase the commitment to society's core values and 
institutions. Thus, more education would tend to move individuals to the right in predominantly 
conservative societies and to the left in predominantly liberal societies. 
Concerning the aforementioned theories, the primary finding in this paper that increased educational 
attainment tends to move individuals to the right of the political spectrum could be consistent with 
either the self-interest thesis or the socialization thesis and is inconsistent with the developmental 
thesis. Closer examination of individual countries reveals most support for the self-interest thesis. 
Specifically, education tends to have a stronger causal effect on political ideology in countries where 
previous research has shown the reforms to be effective in increasing earnings and no causal effect in 
countries where research has shown the reforms to not affect earnings. 
Aside from the contribution to the literature on the relationship between educational attainment and 
political attitudes, this paper adds to the growing literature concerning non-pecuniary effects of 
education. Most often, researchers use changes in compulsory education laws as a source of 
exogenous variation to identify the effects of interest. Much of this compulsory education literature 
has focused on labor market outcomes such as income and employment (Aakvik, Salvanes, & Vaage, 
2010; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001; Angrist & Krueger, 1991; Brunello, Fort, & Weber, 2009; Meghir 
and Palme, 2005; Oreopoulos, 2006a, b). More recently, non-pecuniary effects of education are 
receiving more attention (Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2011). For example, increases in education have 
been shown to reduce crime (Hjalmarsson, Holmlund, & Lindquist, 2015; Lochner and Moretti, 2004; 
Machin, Marie, & Vujic, 2011), reduce teenage births (Black, Devereux, & Salvanes, 2008), improve 
health outcomes1 (Gathmann, Jürges, & Reinhold, 2015; Lleras-Muney, 2005; van Kippersluis, 
O'Donnell, & van Doorslaer, 2011), and increase pro-environmental behavior (Meyer, 2015). 
 
In the political realm, Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos (2004) and Dee (2004) find that increases in 
education cause political involvement and voting to increase. However, there are also mixed results in 
this area. Siedler (2010)finds little evidence of a causal effect of education on political behavior in 
Germany. Borgonovi, d'Hombres, and Hoskins (2010) pool reforms from 15 European countries and 
find that education increases political information acquisition but has no effect on voter turnout. Di 
Pietro and Delprato (2009 )examine the effects of a compulsory education reform in Italy on a number 
of civic outcomes. The authors find a positive and significant effect on interest in politics, a negative 
and significant effect on the stated justifiability of not returning lost money to an owner and 
insignificant effects on the justifiability of not paying a ticket on a public transport vehicle and of not 
leaving one's name for the owner of a car one accidentally scraped, and an insignificant effect on the 
stated importance of the problem of tax evasion. Most recently, Persson, Lindgren, and Oskarsson 
(2016), leverage exogenous variation in school entry age in Greece, Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden to 
estimate the casual effect of the ninth year of education; the authors find no significant effect on 
political participation, democratic values, or political knowledge. 
 
More generally, this study contributes to the literature that analyzes the determinants of voting 
intentions and support for politicians. Most of this work concentrates on how economic conditions 
affect voting intentions—often termed economic voting. For example, Veiga and Veiga (2004) find that 
economic conditions are important in determining support for right-wing and left-wing governments in 
Portugal. Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) and Cassette, Farvaque, and Hericourt (2013) examine how 
local public spending affect municipal elections in Brazil and France, respectively. Yet, the approach in 
the present paper differs because it concentrates on a key individual-level determinant of political 
identity rather than national or local factors. The present results do suggest, however, that voting 
behavior could be influenced by public policies that change the level of required education. For 
example, any public policies that reduce the number of high school dropouts could affect political 
ideology. The results suggest that the effects would be largest in cases where the extra education is 
effective in increasing earnings of the compliers. 
2. Data 
The analysis in this paper requires information about left-right political ideology and compulsory 
education laws. 25 waves of Eurobarometer surveys provide the data on left-right political ideology 
and several recent papers provide the needed information about compulsory education laws. The 
European Commission regularly conducts population representative public opinion surveys of 
European Citizens; these are Eurobarometer surveys. I identify 25 waves of Eurobarometer surveys 
conducted between October 2004 and March 2012 that contain a question about left-right political 
identification.2 Each wave collects data over a span of 1 to 3 months during the months of September-
May.3 All waves utilized face-to-face interviews, where interviewers followed uniform protocols. Each 
of the waves completed interviews with approximately 1000 individuals from each country and no 
more than one individual was interviewed from each household. In addition to the left-right ideology 
question, interviewers collect several demographic variables including gender, age, and age when the 
individual left formal education.4 As in Meyer (2015), I assume that educational attainment increases 
only until age 25 and exclude those who report an age of 36 or higher when they stopped full-time 
education.5 Using the age when an individual stops education as a proxy of educational attainment is 
not a perfect measure because of possible gaps in one's education. However, this will only bias the 
estimated effect of reform on education if there are more people with gaps before or after a reform on 
average. 
 
Following Borgonovi et al. (2010), Brunello et al. (2009), Brunello, Fabbri, and Fort (2013), Gathmann et 
al. (2015), and Meyer (2015), I elect to pool multiple educational reforms that occurred in 20th Century 
Europe. I begin with the group of reforms detailed in Gathmann et al. (2015); these reforms were 
implemented between 1900 and 1980.6 I then add the three remaining country-level reforms 
from Brunello et al. (2009) that fall within this time period.7 This results in a list of 18 reforms from 11 
Western European countries, which are summarized in Table 1. All of these reforms have been 
leveraged as instruments in multiple studies. Fort (2006) documents the details of many of the 
reforms. As mentioned in Fort (2006), the exact date that each reform began to affect the population is 
sometimes in dispute. Thus, I follow Meyer (2015) in using implementation dates that are consistent 
with Brunello et al. (2009) and Gathmann et al. (2015). These reforms increased the minimum 
education level by 1 to 4 years and affected individuals born between 1917 and 1969. The typical 
reform among this group moved the minimum leaving age up to the 9th or 10th grade. As previously 
mentioned, the key attribute of these reforms is that they provide plausibly exogenous variation in 
educational attainment. Individuals are compelled into the additional education rather than electing 
the extra education because of unobserved factors. 
 
Table 1. Reforms. 
Country/region Reform date First cohort potentially affected Change in min. schooling level Source 
Austria 1962 1947 8–9 BR, F, GA 
Belgium 1983 1969 8–12 BR, F 
Denmark 1971 1957 7–9 AR, BR, F, GA 
England and Wales 1947 1933 8–9 CR, DH, GA, HW, O 
England and Wales 1973 1958 9–10 CR, GA, GR, HW 
France 1937 1923 7–8 AL, F, GA 
France 1959/1967 1953 8–10 AL, BR, F, GA, GR 
Greece 1975 1963 6–9 B, F 
Ireland 1972 1958 8–9 BR, CH, GA 
Italy 1963 1949 5–9 BC, BR, F, GA, DD 
Country/region Reform date First cohort potentially affected Change in min. schooling level Source 
Netherlands 1928 1917 6–7 GA, vK 
Netherlands 1950 1938 7–9 GA, L 
Netherlands 1973 1959 9–10 BR, F, GA, L 
Northern Ireland 1957 1943 8–9 GA, F, O 
Scotland 1946 1932 8–9 GA 
Scotland 1976 1958 9–10 GA 
Spain 1970 1957 6–8 BR, F, GA, P 
Sweden 1962 1950 8–9 BR, F, HJ, M 
Note: AL = Albouy and Lequien (2009), AR = Arendt (2005), BC = Brandolini and Cippolone (2002), BR = Brunello et al. 
(2009), CH = Callan and Harmon (1999), CR = Clark and Royer (2013), DH = Devereux and Hart (2010), DD = Di Pietro and 
Delprato (2009), F = Fort (2006), GA = Gathman et al. (2015), GR = Grenet (2013), HJ = Hjalmarsson et al. (2015), HW 
= Harmon and Walker (1995), L = Levin and Plug (1999), M = Meghir and Palme (2005), O = Oreopoulos (2006a), P = Pons 
and Gonzalo (2002), vK = van Kippersluis et al. (2011). Adapted from Ecological Economics, Vol. 116 No. 0, Meyer, A., “Does 
Education Increase Pro-Environmental Behavior? Evidence from Europe”, Table 1, Page 111, Copyright (2015), with 
permission from Elsevier. 
 
The analysis only includes individuals born close enough to a change in the corresponding education 
reform. Define the pivot cohort as the first cohort that was potentially affected by a change in 
compulsory education law j and denote the birth year of the pivot cohort as bj. Let k = (b − bj) indicate 
the number of years between the cohort from year b and the pivot cohort. Clearly, I need to know 
when an individual was born to make this calculation. Some approximation is required here because 
only age, not birth year, is reported on the survey. As discussed in Meyer (2015), one can be fairly 
certain of the birth year from some survey waves. For example, Eurobarometer 68.2 was conducted in 
the months of November 2007–January 2008. Nearly all of the respondents would have had their 
birthday in calendar year 2007. It is less clear for other survey waves such as Eurobarometer 75.2 
because it was conducted in the months of April-May 2011; there is a higher likelihood that an 
individual would not have had their birthday in calendar year 2011 at the time of the survey. 
Therefore, I code birth year as (year-age) for individuals in survey waves conducted between 
September and December and (year-age-1) for individuals in survey waves conducted between January 
and May.8 
 
To begin, individuals with k ∈ [ − 10, −1] comprise the pre-reform sample and individuals with k ∈ [1, 
10] make up the post-reform sample.9 In this bandwidth of ±10 years, there are 109,238 observations 
from individuals who provide an answer to the question about educational attainment. I then narrow 
the sample to include only individuals who provide an answer to the left-right political ideology 
question, leaving 94,694 observations. The specific wording of the left-right political ideology question, 
which is identical in all waves of the survey, is as follows, “In political matters people talk of the ‘the 
left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your views on this scale?” Interviewers then showed the 
respondent a card with a 10 point scale, ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right). 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of the answer to the left-right identity question for the 94,694 
individuals who answer the question. In addition, I present a histogram to visualize the distribution 
in Fig. 1. The distribution is approximately symmetric with a clear spike corresponding to the answer of 
“5”. An answer of “5” likely indicates that an individual sees themselves as a centrist, not identifying 
with either the left or the right. Table 3 summarizes this variable by country; there are only modest 
differences in the averages across the sample countries. Table 4 provides summary statistics for each 
of the variables. The average age when leaving full-time education for the sample is approximately 
18.5, the sample is approximately 49% male, the average age is about 54 years, and the average 
response to the left-right ideology question is 5.18. Moreover, a little more than one-half of the 
individuals in the sample were affected by the educational reforms. The online appendix provides 
summary statistics by country. The biggest differences across countries are in age, which is determined 
by the date(s) of each country's reform(s), and in average age of leaving full-time education. For 
example, the average age of leaving full-time education in some countries such as Spain, Italy, and UK 
is less than 17 years whereas the average age of leaving education is as high as 21.38 in Denmark and 
20.21 in Sweden. 
 
Table 2. Summary of self-reported left-right placement. 
Left-right 
  
placement N Percent 
Box 1 – left 3889 4.11 
Box 2 4174 4.41 
Box 3 11,479 12.12 
Box 4 12,614 13.32 
Box 5 26,231 27.70 
Box 6 12,252 12.94 
Box 7 11,443 12.08 
Box 8 7772 8.21 
Box 9 2016 2.13 
Box 10 – right 2824 2.98 
Left-right 
  
placement N Percent 
Total 94,694 100 
Note: This summarizes the sample generated by a bandwidth of ±10 years. 
 
Fig. 1. Political ideology. Note: Histogram displays frequency of respondents’ political ideology responses. 1 = far 
left, 10 = far right. 
 
Table 3. Left-right placement by country. 
Country N Mean Std. Dev. 
Austria 6263 5.26 1.95 
Belgium 7657 5.07 1.89 
Denmark 7571 5.29 2.11 
Greece 6392 5.40 2.16 
France 9535 5.01 1.99 
Ireland 6972 5.60 1.82 
Italy 5045 5.18 2.43 
Netherlands 17,337 5.06 1.97 
Spain 5926 4.50 1.94 
Sweden 8605 5.32 2.16 
United Kingdom 13,391 5.30 1.84 
Note: This summarizes the sample generated by a bandwidth of ±10 years. 
  
Table 4. Summary statistics. 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bandwidth of ±10 years 
Education age 94,694 18.50 3.84 0 25 
Reform 94,694 0.531 0.499 0 1 
Male 94,694 0.491 0.500 0 1 
Age 94,694 54.22 11.70 25 97 
Left identity 94,694 5.18 2.02 1 10 
Bandwidth of ±7 years 
Education age 66,267 18.51 3.81 0 25 
Reform 66,267 0.521 0.500 0 1 
Male 66,267 0.489 0.500 0 1 
Age 66,267 54.43 11.21 28 97 
Left right placement 66,267 5.16 2.01 1 10 
3. Empirical strategy 
The principal goal of this study is to estimate the impact of educational attainment on political 
ideology, as measured by left-right identity. In the experimental ideal, one would randomly assign 
individuals to different levels of education and then analyze differences in ideology across groups. 
However, absent such a randomized controlled trial, individuals will self-select into different levels of 
education and choose their political identity. Therefore, unobserved factors will likely impact both 
educational attainment and political ideology. As such, the primary empirical concern is omitted 
variables bias. I adopt an instrumental variables (IV) strategy to address endogeneity from the omitted 
variables. Changes in compulsory educational laws have become the instrument of choice for 
educational attainment in related research. Following this literature, I argue that changes in 
compulsory education laws are valid as an instrument because these changes exogenously compel 
individuals into higher educational attainment. That is, changes in these laws affect educational 
attainment but are uncorrelated with other unobservable factors that affect the outcome of interest—
in this case political ideology. 
Previous research establishes the positive impact of this set of reforms on average educational 
attainment (Brunello et al., 2009; Brunello et al., 2013; Gathmann et al., 2015; Meyer, 2015). 
Nevertheless, it is useful to graphically present evidence of a discrete jump in educational attainment 
for the cohorts first affected by the reform in this particular sample. Recall that k is the interval in 
number of years before or after the first affected cohort from each reform. Panels A and B of Fig. 2 plot 
average education versus k for 10 years pre- and -post-reform. For Panel A, I then regress education 
on k and k2 for two subsamples, once for the pre-reform period and once for the post-reform period. 
Finally, I plot the fitted values from these regressions to show the trends in educational attainment. 
Panel B of Fig. 2 shows the analogous graph for linear controls. Both panels of Fig. 2 show a 
discontinuity in average educational attainment in the year of the reform. Individuals born in the 
cohort immediately prior to a reform (k = −1) are predicted to leave formal education 0.37 years earlier 
than individuals born in a cohort immediately following a reform (k = 1) in Panel A for quadratic 
controls. The size of the discontinuity for linear controls in Panel B is 0.26 years. I also show the 
analogous graphs using linear controls and bandwidths of 7 (Panel A) and 5 (Panel B) in Fig. 3. From Fig. 
3, it appears that a linear functional form fits the data rather well in these narrowed bandwidths. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Education age vs. interval (k), bandwidth of 10. Note: Average education values represent means of all 
observations for a given interval (k). Fitted values are from separate regressions of education age on interval and 
interval squared (Panel A) and education age on interval (Panel B). The interval of 0 corresponds to the pivot 
cohort. Positive interval values correspond to individuals treated with educational reforms. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Education age vs. interval (k), narrowed bandwidths. Note: average education values represent means of 
all observations for a given interval (k). Fitted values are from separate regressions of education age on interval. 
The interval of 0 corresponds to the pivot cohort. Positive interval values correspond to individuals treated with 
educational reforms. 
 
Following the approach utilized elsewhere in the literature, I utilize a fuzzy regression discontinuity 
design (RDD) to identify the effect of compulsory education reforms on political ideology. This leads to 
the following two-equation model specification for individual i from reform c. 
(1) 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽2




𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑙𝑙(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝑖𝑖′ 𝛼𝛼2
+𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .
 
Here, f(kic) and g(kic) are controls for cohort trends, 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝑖𝑖′  is a vector of exogenous controls,10Ric is an 
indicator for being affected by the educational reform, ReformFE is a set of reform fixed effects, 
and SurveyFE is set of survey wave fixed effects. 
 
Identification of α1 in the RDD requires that the potentially endogenous relationship between birth 
cohort and educational attainment is captured by the controls, g(kic). After controlling for these cohort 
trends, individuals on both sides of the pivot cohort should have the same average educational 
attainment within some range. A discontinuous jump in educational attainment at the pivot cohort can 
then be attributed to the reform. I allow the slope of the regression function to change at the pivot 
cohort by interacting the linear or quadratic controls with the reform indicator, Ric. Therefore, with 
quadratic controls,11Eq. (2) becomes 
(3) 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾3𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
+𝛾𝛾4(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 ) + 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝑖𝑖′ 𝛼𝛼2
+𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .
 
Eq. (1) is then analogously modified to substitute the appropriate linear or quadratic controls for f(kic), 
resulting in 
(4) 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆2(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜆𝜆3𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
+𝜆𝜆4(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 ) + 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽2
+𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 
for the case of quadratic controls.12 Furthermore, I interact the linear/quadratic controls in Eqs. (3) and 
(4) with a set of reform dummies so that each reform can take on its own trend.13 
I initially set the bandwidth at ±10 years, which produces the maximum sample size with no individual 
being counted as part of both the pre- and –post-reform groups. This also corresponds to the window 
chosen by Gathmann et al. (2015). I then decrease the bandwidth to ±7 years as a specification check. 
A 7 year bandwidth substantially cuts the sample size but matches the window chosen by Brunello et 
al. (2009). The tradeoff is that wider bandwidths provide more power but may increase the probability 
that the included controls do not adequately capture cohort trends. Moreover, I report results for all 
other possible bandwidths of 2–6 and 8–9 years. 
 
As previously mentioned, I exclude individuals from the pivot cohort because I cannot reliably 
determine whether or not they were treated with the reform. Therefore, I am effectively utilizing a 
“donut-hole” RD estimator.14 Previous studies have shown that this strategy can be advantageous for 
reasons beyond measurement error. One typical issue in RD estimation is the possibility of 
manipulation of the forcing variable (Lee & Lemieux, 2010; McCrary, 2008); the “donut-hole” approach 
can be useful if one suspects such manipulation. For example, Barreca, Guldi, Lindo and Waddell 
(2011) revisit the conclusions of Almond, Doyle, Kowalski, and Williams (2010) regarding the reduction 
in 1-year infant mortality as birth weight crosses the 1500 g “very-low-birth-weight (VLBW)” 
threshold. Barreca et al. (2011) note that the observations occurring at this important threshold are 
systematically different from those on either side of the threshold so including these threshold 
observations can bias results. Furthermore, the authors argue that RD estimates should not be 
sensitive to the observations at the threshold so it can be useful to remove a “donut-hole” of 
observations (Barreca et al., 2011). Due to merging 25 different waves of surveys with inconsistent 
demographic questions, I do not have the ability to test for differences in observable characteristics 
from individuals in different birth cohorts. In the present context, therefore, one advantage of the 
donut-hole RD is that it allows for the possibility that individuals born in the pivot cohort are 
systematically different from the surrounding cohorts.15 
 
Consistent with previous studies in this literature (Brunello et al., 2009; Gathmann et al., 2015; Grenet, 
2013; Meyer, 2015), I view these as parametric regression specifications. This implicitly assumes that 
we know the functional form. Many recent RDD papers instead use nonparametric local polynomial 
regression, which is more appropriate if we are treating the functional form as unknown. Therefore, I 
also report results using local linear specifications of the fuzzy RDD instead of the parametric global 
polynomial approach. I utilize a triangular kernel to weight observations and a local quadratic 
polynomial for bias correction. I select the bandwidth in two ways; I first use the cross-validation 
procedure from Ludwig and Miller (2007) and then use the Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
(2012) approach. In each case, I present conventional and bias corrected point estimates along with 
conventional and robust (Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik, 2014a) standard errors.16 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Main results 
To begin, columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 present 2SLS results from the bandwidths of ±10 years from a 
pivot cohort. Column 1 uses linear controls while column 2 uses quadratic controls. Error terms may 
possibly be correlated between individuals from the same reform group and birth cohort. As such, I 
cluster standard errors at the birth year-reform level.17 I do find a statistically significant local average 
treatment effect (LATE) of educational attainment on left-right ideology. An additional year of 
educational attainment leads to an approximate 0.25 point movement to the right on the 10 point 
scale. Relative to the sample mean of political affiliation, this represents an approximate 5% movement 
to the right. 
  
 
Table 5. 2SLS regression results. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
2nd stage. Outcome is left-right affiliation. 1 = far left, 5 = center, 10 = far right 
Education age 0.256** 0.235** 0.249** 0.269* 
 
(0.120) (0.116) (0.107) (0.157) 
Male 0.0466 0.0533 0.0549 0.0491 
 
(0.0460) (0.0445) (0.0459) (0.0578) 
Age 0.0332 0.0336 0.0526 0.0582 
 
(0.0273) (0.0267) (0.0321) (0.0408) 
Age2 −0.000357 −0.000361 −0.000483* −0.000534 
 
(0.000228) (0.000225) (0.000264) (0.000345) 
1st stage. Outcome is education age. 
Reform 0.253*** 0.372*** 0.316*** 0.332*** 
 
(0.0487) (0.0841) (0.0603) (0.111) 
Male 0.323*** 0.323*** 0.322*** 0.323*** 
 
(0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0266) (0.0267) 
Age −0.168*** −0.176*** −0.232*** −0.232*** 
 
(0.0248) (0.0250) (0.0309) (0.0310) 
Age2 0.00145*** 0.00151*** 0.00195*** 0.00195*** 
 
(0.000207) (0.000209) (0.000258) (0.000259) 
F-Stat 310.85 216.94 219.13 152.66 
(p-value) <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
F-Stat on excluded instrument 24.02 24.00 28.11 12.77 
(p-value) <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0004 
Bandwidth ±10 ±10 ±7 ±7 
Cohort trends Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic 
N 94,694 94,694 66,267 66,267 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level. 






As a specification check, I next decrease the bandwidth to ±7 years in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5. The 
estimated effects of education on political ideology are rather similar to their counterparts in columns 
1 and 2. I also show abbreviated results for bandwidths of 2–6 and 8–9 years in Table 6 for the case of 
linear cohort trends. As seen in Table 6, an extra year of education leads to a movement to the right of 
0.22–0.47 across the various bandwidths, with most of the point estimates concentrated around 0.25. 
 
Table 6. 2SLS regression results, alternative bandwidths. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Bandwidth ±9 ±8 ±6 ±5 ±4 ±3 ±2 
2nd stage. Outcome is left-right affiliation. 1 = far left, 5 = center, 10 = far right 
Education age 0.241** 0.220** 0.224** 0.258** 0.331* 0.282* 0.470** 
 
(0.112) (0.111) (0.0967) (0.120) (0.174) (0.149) (0.237) 
1st stage. Outcome is education age. 
Reform 0.270*** 0.293*** 0.357*** 0.306*** 0.257*** 0.326*** 0.260* 
 
(0.0519) (0.0555) (0.0662) (0.0743) (0.0867) (0.107) (0.158) 
F-Stat on excluded instrument 24.54 26.17 33.61 20.86 11.30 13.65 10.80 
(p-value) <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.001 0.0003 0.0016 
N 85,344 76,056 56,842 47,212 37,558 28,195 18,647 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level. 
All regressions include gender controls, a quadratic of age, linear cohort trends that can vary at the reform level, 





When using 2SLS one may be concerned about the possibility of weak instruments. Therefore, I 
present first stage regression results in Tables 5 and 6. The first stage results from all specifications 
show that the educational reform does have a statistically significant positive effect. Moreover, the F-
stats are all above the rule of thumb value of 10 (Stock, Wright, & Yogo, 2002). Furthermore, the 
magnitude of the first stage effect is in line with previous studies. Using many of the same 
reforms, Gathmann et al. (2015)report a first stage of 0.501 (men)/0.541 women and Brunello et al. 
(2009)show an average first stage of around 0.3. With a slightly different set of reforms, Borgonovi et 
al. (2010) report a first stage of 0.508. 
 
All results presented thus far have attempted to deal with the endogeneity of education. However, it is 
illustrative to examine the results when treating education as exogenous. Thus, Table 7 shows OLS 
results from 4 representative bandwidths. As seen across the columns of Table 7, there is a statistically 
significant association between educational attainment and left-leaning ideology when treating 
education as exogenous. This could suggest that unobservable characteristics tend to move individuals 
toward a left political ideology as educational attainment increases. Alternatively, it could be that the 
subgroup of compliers–those who take up treatment from the instrument–is different from the 
general population. In the context of these compulsory educational reforms, the compliers are likely 
located in the lower end of the educational attainment distribution. Thus, one should interpret the 
findings in this paper as representing the effect of education on political identity at the lower end of 
the educational distribution and for these particular reforms. 
 
Table 7. Exogenous education regression results: OLS. 
 
(1) (2) (2) (3) 
Bandwidth ±10 ±7 ±5 ±2 
Education age −0.0149*** −0.0163*** −0.0189*** −0.0223*** 
 
(0.00347) (0.00408) (0.00468) (0.00698) 
Male 0.136*** 0.142*** 0.137*** 0.130*** 
 
(0.0181) (0.0217) (0.0260) (0.0404) 
N 94,694 66,267 47,212 18,647 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level. All regressions include a 
quadratic of age, reform fixed effects, and survey wave fixed effects. 
***p < 0.01, 
4.2. Ordered probit results 
The results presented so far treat the left-right affiliation as a continuous variable and assume a 
constant marginal effect of education on political affiliation. This is likely a fine approximation but I also 
address this issue by estimating two ordered probit specifications that use all available observations 
and treat educational attainment as endogenous. The ordered probit model utilizes Eqs. (3) and (4), 
but substitutes a latent index in place of the continuous left-hand side variable in Eq. (4).18 IV ordered 
probit specification 1 (IVOP1) codes the dependent variable into 3 categories (original responses of 1 
through 4 = “1”, 5 = “2”, 6 through 10 = “3”). IV ordered probit specification 2 (IVOP2) codes the 
dependent variable into 5 categories (original responses of 1 or 2 = “1”, 3 or 4 = “2”, 5 = “3”, 6 or 7 = 
“4”, 8 through 10 = “5”). The main drawback of the ordered probit model is that interpretation is more 
complicated. In interpreting the impact of educational attainment on political identity, there are as 
many marginal effects as categories of the dependent variable. IVOP1 has the simpler interpretation as 
the categories correspond to “left,” “center,” and “right.” IVOP2 is more flexible and attempts to group 
the values of the dependent variable according to the patterns visible in Fig. 1. 
 
Table 8 presents maximum likelihood results from the two ordered probit specifications for linear 
controls and a bandwidth of ±7 years. As seen in Table 8, the ordered probit results are consistent with 
the baseline 2SLS results. The positive signs on the coefficients on education across the columns 
indicate that, when accounting for the endogeneity of education, additional educational attainment 
moves individuals to the right of the political scale. However, one must examine the average marginal 
effects to infer the magnitude of the change. The interpretation of the marginal effects is most 
straightforward in column 1 from IVOP1 so I concentrate on those but note that the results in column 2 
from IVOP2 tell a similar story. Results in column 1 suggest that an extra year of educational 
attainment decreases the probability of falling into the left category (1–4) by approximately 4 
percentage points and increases the probability of falling into the right category (6–10) by a similar 
magnitude. There is a statistically significant decrease in the probability of falling into the center 
category (5) with more education; however, this effect has near 0 magnitude. Therefore, overall, the 
results from Table 8support the baseline analysis in showing that additional educational attainment 
moves individuals to the right. 
 
Table 8. IV ordered probit regression results. 
 
(1) (2) 
Variables MLE (IVOP1) MLE (IVOP2) 





Cut1 3.95** 2.24 
 
(1.79) (1.91) 















Variables MLE (IVOP1) MLE (IVOP2) 
Average ME of education 















Center (5) −0.00108*** −0.00106*** 
 
(0.00011) (0.00017) 















Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level. 
All regressions include gender controls, a quadratic of age, linear cohort trends that can vary at the reform level, 
reform fixed effects, and survey wave fixed effects. N = 66,267. The bandwidth is ±7 years. 





4.3. Discussion of theories and country-specific results 
The developmental thesis predicts that education will move individuals to a more liberal ideology and 
is hence not supported by the results presented in the preceding sections. In contrast, according to the 
self-interest thesis, individuals will move to the right out of self-interest when their incomes increase. 
Previous research establishes that many of these reforms increased earnings for the compliers. 
However, other papers find small or no effects on earnings. Appendix Table A1 summarizes previous 
studies of the compulsory education reforms utilized in this paper and shows that there is strongest 
prior evidence of significant earnings increases for the UK reforms and some evidence of earnings 
increases for Italy and Netherlands. Thus, if the self-interest thesis is correct, we should see more 
movement to the political right in these countries. Likewise, we should not see significant movement 
to the right in countries such as France or Sweden where the reforms have not been shown to 
significantly affect earnings. Hence, instead of pooling together all the reforms and running one 
analysis, I estimate the model on each of the countries separately. Table 9 shows the LATE of education 
on political ideology by country. To probe the stability of the results, I present 4 bandwidths for each 
country. The sample size drastically decreases when examining one country at a time which cuts 
statistical power, but the point estimates are informative. The second stage point estimates are 
consistently positive for 3 of the 11 countries (Italy, Netherlands, and UK), consistently negative for 1 
country (Spain), and sometimes positive/sometimes negative for 7 of the countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, and Sweden). However, the standard errors are large for most of 
these estimates so I typically cannot reject the null of 0 effect at conventional levels. In support of the 
self-interest thesis, I find some evidence that the Italian reform moved individuals to the right and no 
evidence that the French reforms affected political ideology. I also find weak evidence that the UK 
reforms may have moved individuals to the right, but the estimates are never significant at 
conventional levels. There is some evidence that the Swedish reform moved individuals to the right but 
the result does not appear robust to the bandwidth selection. As seen in Table A1, Meghir and Palme 
(2005) find little evidence that this reform increased earnings, with a small positive point estimate. 
Therefore, overall, the country-specific results are consistent with the predictions of the self-interest 
thesis. 
 
Table 9. Regression results by country. 
Country/region 
N Bandwidth 
2nd stage effect of 
education on political 
ideology 
1st stage effect of 
reform on education 
1st stage F-Stat on 
excluded instrument 
Austria 4403 7 −1.92 (3.84) −0.105 (0.200) 0.279 
Austria 6263 10 −0.647 (0.514) −0.296*(0.161) 3.39 
Austria 5690 9 −0.485 (0.461) −0.311*(0.170) 3.33 
Austria 3774 6 0.0496 (0.183) −0.00241 (0.219) 0.000122 
Belgium 5380 7 0.230 (0.572) 0.212 (0.162) 1.71 
Belgium 7657 10 0.0269 (0.338) 0.277** (0.131) 4.50 
Belgium 6930 9 0.0328 (0.408) 0.242* (0.139) 3.04 
Belgium 4641 6 −0.102 (0.476) 0.266 (0.177) 2.25 
Denmark 5093 7 −0.197 (0.564) 0.250 (0.285) 0.771 
Denmark 7571 10 0.474 (0.628) 0.248 (0.224) 1.22 
Denmark 6718 9 0.244 (0.421) 0.313 (0.242) 1.68 
Country/region 
N Bandwidth 
2nd stage effect of 
education on political 
ideology 
1st stage effect of 
reform on education 
1st stage F-Stat on 
excluded instrument 
Denmark 4339 6 −0.137(0.364) 0.414 (0.314) 1.74 
France 6748 7 0.0357 (0.227) 0.474** (0.189) 6.32 
France 9535 10 −0.277 (0.324) 0.297** (0.153) 3.78 
France 8570 9 −0.104 (0.227) 0.414***(0.163) 6.46 
France 5746 6 −0.000035 (0.201) 0.585***(0.207) 8.03 
Greece 4628 7 0.700 (0.652) 0.357 (0.246) 2.12 
Greece 6392 10 −0.0531 (0.371) 0.307 (0.201) 2.35 
Greece 5833 9 0.205 (0.437) 0.305 (0.213) 2.04 
Greece 3965 6 0.855 (1.18) 0.246 (0.270) 0.829 
Ireland 4803 7 −0.152 (1.61) −0.0739 (0.162) 0.208 
Ireland 6972 10 −0.358 (0.958) −0.109 (0.132) 0.687 
Ireland 6287 9 −0.0284 (1.02) −0.0975 (0.140) 0.486 
Ireland 4087 6 0.905 (3.21) −0.0652 (0.182) 0.128 
Italy 3532 7 0.339 (0.220) 0.911*** (0.306) 8.85 
Italy 5045 10 0.339* (0.196) 0.836***(0.248) 11.37 
Italy 4538 9 0.304* (0.178) 0.953***(0.263) 13.10 
Italy 3071 6 0.358** (0.172) 1.31*** (0.339) 14.80 
Netherlands 11,912 7 0.540 (0.413) 0.286** (0.142) 4.04 
Netherlands 17,337 10 1.58 (1.53) 0.131 (0.115) 1.30 
Netherlands 15,562 9 0.994 (0.861) 0.171 (0.122) 1.95 
Netherlands 10,207 6 0.615 (0.542) 0.256* (0.157) 2.66 
Spain 4067 7 −0.993 (1.30) 0.239 (0.288) 0.691 
Spain 5926 10 −0.871 (2.27) 0.101 (0.231) 0.190 
Spain 5316 9 −0.381 (25.33) 0.0376 (0.249) 0.0227 
Spain 3451 6 −4.93 (38.1) 0.0413 (0.320) 0.0167 
Sweden 6192 7 0.316 (0.255) 0.542***(0.212) 6.50 
Sweden 8605 10 −0.150 (0.181) 0.581***(0.173) 11.24 
Sweden 7835 9 0.0481 (0.181) 0.588***(0.184) 10.18 
Sweden 5339 6 0.488* (0.288) 0.601***(0.233) 6.68 
Country/region 
N Bandwidth 
2nd stage effect of 
education on political 
ideology 
1st stage effect of 
reform on education 
1st stage F-Stat on 
excluded instrument 
UK 9509 7 0.0906 (0.237) 0.355***(0.123) 8.37 
UK 13,391 10 0.311 (0.256) 0.290***(0.0993) 8.54 
UK 12,085 9 0.249 (0.257) 0.298***(0.106) 7.93 
UK 8222 6 0.0414 (0.239) 0.383***(0.133) 8.26 
Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are in parentheses. 





Under the socialization thesis, individuals affected by the educational reforms simply learn more about 
the core values of their society. To the extent that the educational system explicitly or implicitly taught 
core values associated with a right-wing status, an additional year of education could push the 
individuals in that direction. I do not have information about how the explicit curricula may have 
differed across the different countries but there are ways to group countries by core values. One 
leading typology relies on classifying the welfare regime. Esping-Anderson (1990, 1999) divides 
European countries into three welfare regimes: liberal, conservative, and social democratic.19Liberal 
countries include Ireland and the UK. Social democratic countries include Denmark and Sweden. 
Conservative countries include Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain. Again referring to 
the country-specific results in Table 9, I find evidence that both supports and conflicts with the 
socialization thesis. Second stage results are strongest for Italy, where it appears that more education 
moves individuals to the political right. This is supportive of the socialization thesis because Italy is 
classified as a conservative country. However, Sweden is classified as a social democratic country so 
the weak positive and significant result disagrees with the socialization thesis. The other two countries 
with consistently positive point estimates across the bandwidths, Netherlands and UK, fall respectively 
into Esping-Anderson's conservative and liberal (neo-liberal, laissez-faire) groupings, which appears 
consistent with the socialization thesis. However, the results that agree with the socialization thesis 
under Esping-Anderson's classification only happen in instances where the results also agree with the 
self-interest thesis. 
 
I use one more metric to gauge the dominant core values of each country. For each country, I take the 
average of the left-right placement value for individuals who were 21 years or older when stopping 
full-time education. Recall that the compulsory education reforms primarily affected individuals in the 
lower end of the education distribution so this measure would reflect the left-right ideology of the 
peers who were not affected. Appendix Table A2 summarizes these averages by country and shows 
that the most left-leaning countries for this sample are Spain, France, and Netherlands. The most right-
leaning countries are Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, and Sweden. Belgium, Greece, and UK fall in 
between the others. Appendix Table A3 shows 2SLS results on these groupings of countries. I find no 
effect of education on political ideology when limiting the sample to the left-leaning countries in 
column 1 but the first stage is somewhat weak. Moreover, the effect does seem strongest in the right-
leaning countries (0.390 in column 2). This LATE for right-leaning countries is approximately 57% larger 
than the overall LATE in Table 5 but it is also less precisely estimated with a borderline weak first stage. 
Column 5 of Table A3 shows a LATE of 0.344 when excluding the left-leaning countries of Spain, France, 
and Netherlands and column 4 of Table A3shows a statistically insignificant LATE of 0.173 when 
excluding the right-leaning countries of Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, and Sweden. Thus, I find no 
evidence that education moves individuals to the left for left-leaning countries. This suggests that the 
socialization thesis is not very potent but societal values may either dampen or intensify any self-
interested movement to the right. 
 
It is also informative to examine the first stage estimates of the effect of an educational reform on 
years of education by country. As seen in Table 9, several of the countries display little evidence of 
reforms increasing educational attainment. Three such countries (Austria, Ireland, and Spain) produce 
negative second stage point estimates for most of the bandwidths. Previous studies also find the 
reforms in Spain (Pons and Gonzalo, 2002) and Ireland (Callan and Harmon, 1999) to be rather 
ineffective in increasing average educational attainment, and hence weak instruments. Across the 
countries, I find first stage effects that are mostly in line with previous studies. I find a first stage effect 
for the UK reforms (0.290–0.383) in Table 9 that is consistent with previous studies from Table A1. The 
first stage effect is comparatively high for France for shorter bandwidths, but comparable to previous 
studies for the bandwidth of 10. I estimate a first stage effect for Italy that is considerably higher than 
the effect found in Brandolini and Cippolone (2002) but lower than the first stage effect from Di Pietro 
and Delprato (2009). Likewise, the first stage effect in Table 9 for Netherlands falls between those 
found by Levin and Plug (1999) and van Kippersluis et al. (2011). For Denmark, the first stage in Table 
9 is similar to that found by Arendt (2005). Finally, I estimate a first stage effect for Sweden that is 
somewhat higher than that found by Meghir and Palme (2005). However, Meghir and Palme 
(2005)have a more refined regional educational reform measure which could explain some of the 
difference.20 Supporting this notion, the first stage effects from Hjalmarsson et al. (2015) when not 
including municipality fixed effects are similar to what I find in Table 9 but similar to Meghir and Palme 
(2005) when including the municipality effects. 
 
4.4. Robustness checks 
Here, I conduct a series of robustness checks. In each case, I set the bandwidth at ±7 years and utilize 
linear cohort controls.21 First, I exclude the countries that have the weakest or negative first stage 
effects of the reforms on educational attainment (Austria, Ireland, and Spain). As seen in column 1 
of Table 10, the second stage estimated LATE increases only slightly and becomes more precise. In 
Column 2, I restrict the sample further to countries that have the strongest evidence of the reforms 
increasing educational attainment (France, Italy, Sweden, and UK). The second stage estimated LATE 
decreases to approximately 0.19 (3.7% of the sample mean) but remains significant at the 5% level. 
Next, recall that I exclude individuals from the pivot cohorts in the baseline analysis. Column 3 of Table 
10 shows results when I include individuals from the pivot cohorts. As would be expected, the 
magnitude of the first stage decreases somewhat here because some individuals who were not actually 
treated with the reform are being coded as though they were treated. Nonetheless, the impact of 
education on political affiliation remains significant at the 10% level. In column 4 of Table 10, rather 
than allowing each reform to take on its own trend, I estimate the model with a common trend. Again, 
there is only a slight change to the point estimates and the second stage estimate remains significant 
at the 10% level. 
 
Table 10. 2SLS regression results, robustness. 
 























2nd stage. Outcome is left-right affiliation. 1 = far left, 5 = center, 10 = far right 
Education age 0.262*** 0.191** 0.190* 0.296* 0.248** 0.249** 0.238** 0.312** 
 
(0.0978) (0.0936) (0.114) (0.159) (0.107) (0.116) (0.109) (0.141) 
1st stage. Outcome is education age. 
Reform 0.390*** 0.508*** 0.249*** 0.304*** 0.315*** 0.316*** 0.292*** 0.352*** 
 




33.44 30.64 20.66 15.30 28.13 21.15 26.66 24.23 
(p-value) <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0001 <0.0001 0.0003 <0.0001 <0.0001 
N 52,994 25,981 70,685 66,267 66,267 66,267 71,419 47,784 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level (except column 6). The 
bandwidth is ±7 years. 
All regressions include gender controls, a quadratic of age, reform fixed effects, and survey wave fixed effects 
(except (5)). 
All except column 4 include linear cohort trends that can vary at the reform level. 
Column 1 includes Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, and UK. Column 2 includes 
France, Italy, Sweden, and UK. 





Next in column 5, I exclude the survey wave fixed effect. In column 6, I cluster standard errors at the 
reform level instead of the baseline birth year-reform level. In column 7, I include the regional reforms 
in Germany that are utilized by Brunello et al. (2009), assuming that individuals were educated in the 
same region in which they lived at the time of the survey. Finally in column 8, I exclude individuals who 
report a left-right political affiliation of 5 (centrist) in case they are fundamentally different in some 
way. As seen in columns 5–8 of Table 10, the magnitude of the estimated LATE changes only modestly 
for these robustness checks and the estimates remain significant at the 5% level. 
 
Another issue is that there are a relatively large number of individuals, approximately 13% of the 
sample, who refuse to answer the political affiliation question. This could be an indication that the 
individual is not politically engaged. Recall that these individuals are dropped from the main analysis. 
Therefore, I alternatively include these individuals in the sample and create a dichotomous variable for 
refusal to answer the political affiliation question. I replace “ideology” with this dichotomous refusal 
variable (1 = refuse, 0 = answer) in Eq. 4 and estimate the model with 2SLS. I do not find any statistical 
evidence that education affects the probability of refusing to answer this question.22 Likewise, one may 
wonder if education significantly affects the probability responding with a “5” to the political ideology 
question given the large spike seen in Fig. 1. Using the same samples from Table 5, I replace “ideology” 
with a dichotomous dependent variable (1 = ideology of 5, 0 = other) and estimate the model with 
2SLS. I find no evidence that education affects the probability of identifying as a political centrist.23 
 
As I am pooling reforms from many different countries, one may wonder whether it is one particular 
country that is driving the results. To investigate this issue I omit one country at a time from the 
sample and re-estimate the model. Appendix Table A4 shows that it is not any one country that is 
responsible for the estimated effect. The estimated first stage effect of the reform on education always 
stays between 0.284 and 0.346. Also, although the precision of the estimated LATE changes depending 
on which country is omitted, the scale is always between 0.206 and 0.306 and always significant at 
conventional levels. 
 
Finally, I report a series of falsification tests. In appendix Table A5, I show RD estimates for six different 
false reform dates. In each case, I utilize the maximum bandwidth for the falsified reform dates that 
does not overlap with the true reform. For example, in column 1 of Table A5, I move each educational 
reform back in time by 4 years relative to the true reform dates. In column 2 of Table A5, I move each 
reform forward by 4 years. I then repeat this process for ±7 years and ±10 years relative to the true 
reform dates.24 As seen in Table A5, I find no evidence that these false reform dates significantly affect 
educational attainment; the first stage point estimates on “reform” are near 0 and have large standard 
errors. Furthermore, the second stage effect of education on political affiliation is never statistically 
significant while the point estimates are sometimes negative and sometimes positive. Table A5 
presents another set of falsification tests. In columns 1 and 2, I draw a random number from the 
uniform distribution over the interval of [1917, 1969] for each reform and assign this random year as 
the first affected birth cohort.25 In contrast, in columns 3 and 4, I use the true reform dates but 
randomly assign a false level of educational attainment to each individual.26 Once again, there is no 
evidence that these falsified reforms affect educational attainment or political ideology in columns 1 
and 2. Likewise, there are no statistically significant findings for the falsified educational attainment in 
columns 3 and 4. 
 
4.5. Local linear fuzzy RD results 
Table 11 reports the nonparametric local linear fuzzy RD results. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 11 show 
results for two different optimal bandwidth choices. Column 3 shows results when I manually set the 
bandwidth to approximately 50% of the optimal bandwidth (±5 years). Then, columns 4–5 report 
results for bandwidths of 7 and 10 to compare with the main parametric results in Table 5. The 
conventional and bias-corrected local linear results are statistically significant and similar in magnitude 
to the main parametric results in Section 4.1 when using the optimal bandwidths and conventional 
inference.27 Results for the manual bandwidths in columns 3–5 are statistically significant at 
conventional levels only in some cases and statistical significance does not hold up when using the 
robust inference suggested by Calonico et al. (2014a). However, overall, the local linear results agree 
with the magnitude and sign of the parametric results of Section 4.1. 
 
Table 11. Local linear fuzzy RD estimates. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Structural estimates (2nd stage). Outcome is left-right affiliation 
Conventional 0.303* 0.298* 0.353 0.285* 0.320* 
 
(0.156) (0.156) (0.250) (0.165) (0.165) 
Bias-corrected 0.306** 0.509*** 0.516** 0.431*** 0.261 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
(0.156) (0.156) (0.250) (0.165) (0.165) 
Robust 0.306 0.509 0.516 0.431 0.261 
 
(0.277) (0.379) (0.554) (0.313) (0.285) 
1st stage. Outcome is education age. 
Reform 0.262*** 0.278*** 0.265*** 0.291*** 0.236*** 
 
(0.0658) (0.0699) (0.102) (0.0781) (0.0615) 
      
N 76,056 76,056 37,558 56,842 85,344 
BW type CV IK Manual Manual Manual 
BW local poly 9.0 8.14 5.0 7.0 10.0 
BW bias 9.0 6.68 5.0 7.0 10.0 
Local linear regressions used for point estimators. Local quadratic regressions used for bias correction. 
Triangular kernel used in all cases. BW=bandwidth. 
CV=optimal BW selected by cross-validation procedure (Ludwig & Miller, 2007) 
IK=optimal BW selected according to method of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). 





In this article, I use data from 11 European countries to identify the effect of increasing educational 
attainment on political ideology as measured by self-placement on a left-right scale. Following a 
technique now well established in the literature, I instrument for educational attainment with 18 
compulsory education laws that increased the minimum school leaving age in these 11 countries 
during 20th century Europe. This provides an advantage over previous work that has examined the link 
between education and political ideology as I am able to produce the first causal estimates of the 
education moving some individuals along the political spectrum. Furthermore, these results also add to 
the growing literature concerning the non-pecuniary effects of education. Overall, I find robust 
evidence that an extra year of education moves the average reform complier to the right of the 
political continuum by approximately 5%. 
Previous work provides conflicting theoretical predictions concerning the effect of educational 
attainment on political ideology. The self-interest thesis predicts that individuals will move to the right 
with more education whereas the developmental thesis predicts that individuals will move to the left 
with more education. The socialization thesis, on the other hand, predicts that the effect of 
educational attainment will depend upon the values of the society. In the socialization theory, 
education will tend to move individuals to the right in more right-leaning societies and to the left in 
more left-leaning societies. In the present study, when pooling all of the reforms, I find that education 
moves individuals to the right on average. An analysis of each country independently shows that the 
strongest results occur where previous research has documented a positive return to earnings from 
the educational reforms. Education appears to have no causal effect on left-right political affiliation in 
countries where previous research has shown reforms to be ineffective in increasing earnings. This 
suggests that the likely causal mechanism is that education increases earnings, which then moves 
individuals to the right; this is consistent with the self-interest thesis. 
This study adds to the growing evidence that individuals tend to support political ideologies that are 
aligned with one's own self-interest. Doherty, Gerber, and Green (2006) show that larger lottery 
winnings leads to less support of redistribution and more support of eliminating the estate tax. 
Likewise, Powdthavee and Oswald (2014) show that lottery winners increase their probability of voting 
right by approximately 4 percentage points. Oswald and Powdthavee (2010) empirically show that 
having a daughter moves one to the political left and having a son moves one to the political right, and 
theoretically shows why this can be in one's self-interest. In their sample of individuals from the UK, a 
parent is approximately 2 percentage points more (less) likely to vote left for each daughter (son). 
Thus, the scale of the LATE herein is about the same size as the estimated effect from Powdthavee and 
Oswald (2014) and twice the size of that from Oswald and Powdthavee (2010). However, one may 
expect the effect to be comparatively larger in the present case because the survey is taking place 
typically many years after the educational reform treatment and it may take some time for political 
views to evolve whereas Powdthavee and Oswald (2014) and Oswald and Powdthavee (2010) are 
identifying the more immediate effects on political ideology. 
 
As in any instrumental variables identification strategy, these results apply for the specific instrument 
utilized and for the specific subgroup of individuals who are affected by the instrument. These 
compliers in this context would come from the lower end of the schooling distribution. Therefore, we 
should not use these results to infer what would happen in a very different context, for example the 
United States, under a different compulsory education reform. Similarly, these results cannot speak to 
the causal effect of education at the higher end of the educational attainment distribution such as the 
effect on political identity of treating individuals with another year of college. One would need a 
different instrument that affects individuals in this range of education to answer this question. 
Finally, the results in this paper support the assessment of Bauer et al. (2015)that there can be 
problems with observational studies linking education to left-right identity. I find a positive association 
between educational attainment and left-wing political ideology when failing to account for the 
endogeneity of education. An analysis that treats education as exogenous will likely suffer from 
omitted variables bias and the results herein show that the extent of the bias can be significant. 
Furthermore, there are reasons to believe in this context that multiple omitted variables may play a 
role and they may work in opposite directions. Thus, I would caution against inferring causality from 
studies that do not have an identification strategy to overcome this omitted variables problem. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Reforms from the literature. 
Country/region Study Reform date Gender 1st stage Ln earnings 
effect 
Denmark Arendt (2005) 1971 Men 0.262 N/A 
Denmark Arendt (2005) 1971 Women 0.166 N/A 
England, Wales Clark and Royer (2013) 1947 All 0.450*** N/A 
England, Wales Devereux and Hart (2010) 1947 All 0.506*** 0.021 
England, Wales Devereux and Hart (2010) 1947 Men 0.47*** 0.037** 
England, Wales Devereux and Hart (2010) 1947 Women 0.55*** −0.003 
England, Wales Clark and Royer (2013) 1972/73 All 0.353*** N/A 
England, Wales Grenet (2013) 1972/73 Women 0.310*** 0.067*** 
England, Wales Grenet (2013) 1972/73 Men 0.267*** 0.069*** 
France Albouy and Lequien (2009) 1937 All 0.11 N/A 
France Albouy and Lequien (2009) 1967 All 0.280*** N/A 
France Grenet (2013) 1967 Women 0.274*** −0.007 
France Grenet (2013) 1967 Men 0.263*** −0.004 
Great Britain Oreopoulos (2006a) 1947 All 0.436*** 0.145** 
Great Britain Oreopoulos (2008)a 1947 All 0.408*** 0.066 
Ireland Callan and Harmon (1999) 1972 Men Not reportedb 0.10*** 
Italy Brandolini and Cippolone 
(2002) 
1963 Women 0.124*** 0.207*** 
Country/region Study Reform date Gender 1st stage Ln earnings 
effect 
Italy Di Pietro and Delprato (2009) 1963 Men 1.69* N/A 
Italy Flabbi (1999) 1963 Men Not reported 0.053*** 
Italy Flabbi (1999) 1963 Women Not reported 0.030*** 
N. Ireland Oreopoulos (2006a) 1957 All 0.391*** 0.187** 
N. Ireland Oreopoulos (2008) 1957 All 0.444*** 0.18*** 
Netherlands van Kippersluis et al. (2011) 1928 Men 0.669*** N/A 
Netherlands Levin and Plug (1999) 1947, 1950, 
1975 
Men −0.168, −0.399, −1.927*** 0.064** 
Spain Pons and Gonzalo (2002)c 1970 Men 0.82, 0.72* −0.015 
Sweden Meghir and Palme (2005) 1962 All 0.298*** 0.0142 
Sweden Hjalmarsson et al. (2015) 1962 Men 0.588*** (no municipality 
FE) 
N/A 
Sweden Hjalmarsson et al. (2015) 1962 Women 0.400*** (no municipality 
FE) 
N/A 
Sweden Hjalmarsson et al. (2015) 1962 Men 0.328***(municipality FE) N/A 
Sweden Hjalmarsson et al. (2015) 1962 Women 0.199***(municipality FE) N/A 
UK Harmon and Walker (1995) 1947, 1972/73 Men 0.54*, 0.11* 0.15** 
UK Oreopoulos (2006a) 1947/1957 All 0.397*** 0.149*** 
UK Oreopoulos (2008) 1947/1957 All 0.44** 0.105*** 
aOreopoulos (2008) is a corrigendum to Oreopoulos (2006a). 
bCallan and Harmon (1999) state that the reform is not a valid instrument and they do not use it in their final IV 
regressions. 






Table A2. Left-right placement by country for individuals leaving full-time education at 
21 years or older. 
Country N Mean Std. Dev. 
Austria 824 5.38 2.02 
Belgium 3346 5.04 1.85 
Denmark 4974 5.20 2.10 
Country N Mean Std. Dev. 
Greece 1808 5.06 2.08 
France 1959 4.80 1.98 
Ireland 1129 5.45 1.81 
Italy 707 5.15 2.56 
Netherlands 6566 4.80 1.96 
Spain 1032 4.44 2.01 
Sweden 3994 5.50 2.15 
United Kingdom 2068 5.07 1.87 
Note: This summarizes the sample generated by a bandwidth of ±10 years. 
Table A3. 2SLS regression results, countries grouped by left-right placement. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Included countries Left Right Center Left and center Right and center 
2nd stage. Outcome is left-right affiliation. 1 = far left, 5 = center, 10 = far right 
Education age 0.0800 0.390* 0.294 0.173 0.344** 
 
(0.153) (0.208) (0.194) (0.120) (0.142) 
1st stage. Outcome is education age. 
Reform 0.345*** 0.296*** 0.317*** 0.332*** 0.306*** 
 
(0.120) (0.102) (0.0771) (0.0727) (0.0657) 
F-Stat on excluded instrument 8.27 8.42 16.93 20.86 21.68 
(p-value) 0.0051 0.0050 0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
N 22,727 24,023 19,517 42,244 43,540 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level. The bandwidth is ±7 years. 
All regressions include gender controls, a quadratic of age, linear cohort trends that can vary at the reform level, 
reform fixed effects, and survey wave fixed effects. 
Left group = France, Netherlands, and Spain. Right group = Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, and Sweden. Center 





Table A4. Regression results leaving out 1 country. 
Omitted 
country 
N 2nd stage effect of education age 
on political ideology 
1st stage effect of reform on 
education age 
1st stage F-Stat on 
excluded instrument 
Austria 61,864 0.206** (0.0961) 0.342*** (0.0630) 29.39 
Omitted 
country 
N 2nd stage effect of education age 
on political ideology 
1st stage effect of reform on 
education age 
1st stage F-Stat on 
excluded instrument 
Belgium 60,887 0.251** (0.107) 0.327*** (0.0641) 26.10 
Denmark 61,174 0.271** (0.108) 0.327*** (0.0606) 29.04 
Greece 61,639 0.206* (0.108) 0.313*** (0.0624) 25.13 
France 59,519 0.296** (0.125) 0.296*** (0.0598) 24.44 
Ireland 61,464 0.251** (0.105) 0.346*** (0.0630) 30.21 
Italy 62,735 0.226* (0.123) 0.284*** (0.0593) 22.92 
Netherlands 54,355 0.211* (0.111) 0.321*** (0.0656) 23.93 
Spain 62,200 0.306*** (0.112) 0.324*** (0.0602) 29.05 
Sweden 60,075 0.239** (0.119) 0.293*** (0.0626) 21.94 
United 
Kingdom 
56,758 0.282** (0.125) 0.307*** (0.0679) 20.45 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level. The bandwidth is ±7 years. 
All regressions include gender controls, a quadratic of age, linear cohort trends that can vary at the reform level, 





Table A5. Falsification tests, reform dates moved backward and forward in time. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2nd stage. Outcome is left-right affiliation. 1 = far left, 5 = center, 10 = far right 
Education age −0.383 −0.303 0.0947 0.726 −0.361  0.546 
 
(0.571) (4.04) (0.435) (0.958) (0.453) (0.843) 
1st stage. Outcome is education age. 
Reform −0.0774 0.0343 0.0726 0.0517 0.0788 0.0382 
 
(0.0693) (0.0663) (0.0534) (0.0518) (0.0504) (0.0440) 
F-Stat on excluded instrument 1.25 0.268 1.85 0.996 2.45 1.00 
N 36,129 39,641 59,678 71,224 77,728 101,114 
False reform year −4 4 −7 7 −10 10 
Bandwidth 4 4 7 7 10 10 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level. The bandwidth is ±7 years. 
All regressions include gender controls, a quadratic of age, linear cohort trends that can vary at the reform level, 
reform fixed effects, and survey wave fixed effects. 
Table A6. Falsification tests, random reform years and random educational attainment. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
2nd stage. Outcome is left-right affiliation. 1 = far left, 5 = center, 10 = far right 
Education age −4.83  7.00 −12.34 −2.82 
 
(11.62) (38.20) (130.44) (7.10) 
1st stage. Outcome is education age 
Reform 0.0292 −0.0123 −0.00634 −0.0231 
 
(0.0694) (0.0673) (0.0669) (0.0568) 
F-Stat on excluded instrument 0.177 0.0332 0.0090 0.165 
N 47, 709 67, 911 66,267 94,694 
Reform year Random Random Actual Actual 
Education Actual Actual Random Random 
Bandwidth 7 10 7 10 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level. The bandwidth is ±7 years. 
All regressions include gender controls, a quadratic of age, linear cohort trends that can vary at the reform level, 





Fig. A1. Density of the forcing variable. Note: Histogram shows the density of observations according to birth 
cohort. Interval (k) = 0 corresponds to the pivot cohort. 
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